Replies to This Discussion

Permalink Reply by Huon Wardle on October 20, 2010 at 6:19pm

Yes, I am tempted to think about this in terms of a 'reset' button where efficacious imitation resets the cosmos to the default package.

Permalink Reply by M Izabel on October 21, 2010 at 10:55am

I think the works of Judith Butler on performativity and enacted discourses and Diana Taylor on the archive and the repertoire as cultural memories will work well in your paper. A ritual is not only a totality or system of signs and symbols but of surfaces as well, and memory is one of those surfaces. In cultures that have performative practices, their cosmologies play different roles in their performances. There's a reason why Latin Americans' devotion to their gods is showy, loud, and colorful. There's also an answer to the question, why praying in the West is silent, contemplative, and deep within.

Permalink Reply by Philip Swift on October 21, 2010 at 1:12pm

Many thanks to everyone for generous comments and engaging questions.

I’d like to expand a bit more on what the concept of cosmology might bring to anthropological understanding, but first off, some much called-for data - ethnographic nitty-gritty.

In the paper, I briefly referred to Schattschneider’s exemplary ethnography of religious practices on Akakura Mountain in northern Japan. As she explains, offerings made at the mountain shrine are often presented in the form of miniature models of the mountain itself (raw rice heaped up into piles; rice cakes stacked into towers, etc). This mode of making offerings is commonplace across Japan.

Why mountains? Because, mountains are understood to be the places where the gods reside. Thus, by a process of substitution, ‘mountain’ (yama, in Japanese) comes to stand for a number of things in which divinities invest themselves, such as the heavy floats drawn by the participants in religious festivals (matsuri). Such festivals in Japan are many and various, and some of them have become major cultural and media events, but their basic function is indeed cosmological: to purify and renew the productivity of the community. As such, all manner of spectacular contraptions and objects are deployed as attractions for getting the gods’ attention, even as, nowadays, they also catch the eyes of so many digital cameras.

An especially dazzling example is the Yamaage festival (Tochigi Prefecture) that Gunji mentions. (Sadly haven’t seen it, but I’ve copied a photo of it below, in order to attract your attention.) The festival involves the use of large set-piece mountains, fitted out with painted panels that can be flipped over to create instant seasonal changes. These reproductions are temporary, subsequently taken down and re-made every year.

But between this showbiz instance and the much more humble piles of rice offered at shrines, the principle (according to Gunji) is the same: that substitution or imitation is ritually effective. According to this theory, reproduction, play, pastiche, aren’t fraudulent or negative things to be avoided; they’re the very name of the game.

Again, slightly different this time: an example from home (i.e., my flat in North London). Every year, my wife (who’s Japanese) visits the Imamiya Ebisu Shrine in Osaka, during a big festival in January, in order to buy a replica bamboo rake (kumade). This charm, just next to me on our living room wall, works by the imitative principle that it ‘rakes in’ luck and money (not dissimilar to the ever-moving arm on the battery-powered ‘Beckoning Cat’, manekineko, that you often see in Japanese restaurants). Just like the festival mountains, this object too is ephemeral, and – like a battery, if you like – needs to be replaced every year (Inge Daniels’ article in JRAI 9, 2003, is very good on all this.)

What all this has to do with praying is less immediately obvious, but it seems to me that if the systematic principle at work is one in which imitation is recognized as effective, as is deployed for the purposes of attracting the attention of divinities, then we might expect to see a bit of it at work in the little action of prayer as well.

In calling all of this ‘cosmological’, what I’m trying to do is to relate these practices to the wider ways in which a world might be organized. ‘Cosmos’, of course, means ‘universe’, but also ‘order’. In calling this ‘cosmetic’, I’m aiming to draw attention to the importance that surfaces play in the ordering of such a world, as well as playing up this etymological link. If we look in our dictionaries, we can see that ‘cosmetic’ (in Greek) is connected to ‘cosmic’. So I’m trying to point to the associations between two things (‘order’ and ‘ornament’) that we might imagine, in our everyday talk, to be unrelated, or only distantly so.

But if I’m interested in mapping or modelling how a world might be organized, then where to draw the line on where the world ends? Or why bother to model at all? This is where Huon’s critique (in his OAC paper) comes in, and it’s why I’m in two minds about it. Thus, one sort of anthropological project would aim to divide the world into different geo-cosmological areas, painting the global map different colours, according to differing regional ontologies. (I might be wrong, but I take this to be Philippe Descola’s big idea.) I must admit that I’m a bit of a sucker for this kind of broad stroke anthropological theorizing, but this is also exactly where I can see the force of Huon’s critique of it.
What I’ve opted for instead, is more of a provisional, tactical method, where a model of cosmology is put to use as a sort of artificial expedient, in order to draw out contrasts that might assist anthropological thinking. So, for provisional purposes, a cosmology in which surfaces are valued in their own right (as appears to be the case in Japanese shrine practices) may be contrasted with one in which they aren’t.

But having said all that, I can well imagine a possible objection, which would be that both projects I differentiate above just amount to the same thing…

Permalink Reply by Philip Swift on October 21, 2010 at 8:02pm

M. Izabel,

Thanks for the performativity tip. I absolutely agree that this term could be very useful for the ethnographic case at hand.

Justin,

As an aside – because I don’t necessarily want the discussion to go off in this direction, but if it does, it does – I just wanted to respond to some of your evocative comments on perspectivism. When I was thinking about this paper, I had in my mind some of the literature you’ve been referring to; specifically the body of work devoted to the rehabilitation (reanimation?) of the concept of animism in anthropology.
(Funnily enough, an anthropologist of Japan, John Clammer, was advocating a return to this term about the same time as it took off in other areas in anthropology.)


Anyway, to recall the principle of mitate (‘seeing-standing’) – according to which, something (say, a mound of rice) comes to stand for something else (a sacred mountain) – mitate involves simulation, but not assimilation, because both the imitation and the thing it imitates are in a relation of superimposition, in which a copy is not necessarily reducible to its referent. What the upshot of this is that it allows for the possibility of concatenating associations, in which, for example, a miniature votive mountain may be a substitute for Mount Fuji, which may in turn be a substitute for a cosmic world-mountain. Hence, I was tempted to draw on Pedersen’s notion of ‘analogous identification’ since, as he says, ‘a logic of endless substitutions seems intrinsic to animist thought’. One reason why I drew back from doing this, however, was Pedersen’s contention that animist logic of this kind is more likely to be associated in societies where social relations are horizontal; if there’s one thing that everybody seems to agree on about Japan, it’s that hierarchy is given a lot of prominence. Thus, feeling uncertain, I didn’t pursue the idea any further.

But even if I’m not sure how to relate my materials to the stuff on perspectivism, I can see some potential in it, especially as it comes across in your own very helpful comments. For example, one of the things I find so interesting about certain conceptions of mirrors in Japan, is (to repeat somewhat) that they’re not straightforwardly representational devices – instruments in which a self recognizes itself. We tend to make exactly that kind of association, hence the narcissistic capacity of mirrors and (when this idea finds its way into anthropology) the post-modern and anti-orientalist argument according to which all we can ever do, in trying to represent others, is represent ourselves (Viveiros de Castro has some very harsh things to say about this in his Métaphysiques Cannibales).

But, in discussions of ideas of mirrors in Japan, a number of authors – including Ruth Benedict, oddly enough – point out that narcissism receives little emphasis. Instead, the stress is often on mirrors as devices for the achievement of transformation or otherness. I mentioned the Amaterasu myth (which I was tempted to call, at one point, ‘The Sun Goddess’ Mirror Stage’, because it’s like Lacan’s theory in reverse), but here are two more examples: In the tradition of Noh theatre, in which actors are often masked, there is a room just off-stage called ‘The Mirror Room’ (kagami no ma). Before making his appearance, the actor will hold his mask before the mirror in the room, and look at himself looking at the mask, looking at himself (and so on and so on). The idea is – almost like an act of possession – to become Other with the mask, and so to become the character to be performed. It might be useful to point out that the Amaterasu myth is treated as the origin of a number of performing arts in Japan.

Second example: There is an ethical maxim in Japan, especially developed in the new religions, according to which ‘Other people are mirrors’ (tachi mukô hito wa kagami nari). The idea articulated here is that you should reflect on your own conduct by means of how you are treated by others. So if, for example, if someone gets angry with me, I need to give consideration to what I might have down to incite that anger in the other. In so reflecting upon myself, the principle is that I should seek to change my behaviour

Sorry Justin – that was a long comment. Apologies to anyone who had to wade through it. Like I said, it was intended as an aside.

Permalink Reply by John McCreery on October 22, 2010 at 3:33am

Thanks for the performativity tip. I absolutely agree that this term could be very useful for the ethnographic case at hand.

Why?

Phillip, I have written at length about how much and why I enjoy your paper. But "performativity"? It is hard to imagine a term better described as mealy-mouthed, vacuous, utterly pointless, absolute crap.

It could be taken to have a particular meaning, e.g., (from a "define: performativity" Google search):

Performativity is a concept that is related to speech act theory, to the pragmatics of language, and to the work of J. L. Austin. It accounts for situations where a proposition may constitute or instantiate the object to which it is meant to refer, as in so-called "performative utterances".

As used by anthropologists, literary critics and others of similar ilk, it has, however, been bloated to conflate two usefully distinct concepts: performative and performance. Personally, I blame S. J. Tambiah, who makes this move in a reanalysis of Malinowski's data on Trobriand gardening magic (Tambiah, S. J.. 1968. The Magical Power of Words. Man: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological. Institute 3:171-208. )

"Performative" as J.L. Austin defined it in How To Do Things With Words, Second Edition (1976, Oxford University Press) refers to a class of speech acts whose utterance produces social facts. Typical examples include a minister or justice of the peace saying, "I now pronounce you man and wife" or the foreman of a jury saying, "We find the defendant guilty as charged." These utterances do not describe states of affairs. So long as the speaker is properly empowered to say them and all of the legal and other conditions required are met, they create states of affairs.

"Performance" is a looser concept, but the top result from a Google search for "define: performance" is as follows:

a dramatic or musical entertainment; "they listened to ten different performances"; "the play ran for 100 performances"; "the frequent performances of the symphony testify to its popularity"
the act of presenting a play or a piece of music or other entertainment; "we congratulated him on his performance at the rehearsal"; "an inspired performance of Mozart's C minor concerto"
the act of performing; of doing something successfully; using knowledge as distinguished from merely possessing it; "they criticised his performance as mayor"; "experience generally improves performance"
any recognized accomplishment; "they admired his performance under stress"; "when Roger Maris powered four home runs in one game his performance merits awe"
operation: process or manner of functioning or operating; "the power of its engine determines its operation"; "the plane's operation in high winds"; "they compared the cooking performance of each oven"; "the jet's performance conformed to high standards"

The primary meanings relevant to ritual analysis point to poetic and dramatic effects, whose uncertainty is the stuff of which literary and other critics and advertising testing services make their livings. A play that deeply moves one individual may leave another cold or disgusted. Ditto for ritual.

I put it to you that when Bond or the salaryman appear to pray, no new social fact is created. None of the apparatus (an empowered speaker, other necessary conditions) are in place for this act to be "performative" in Austin's original sense.

What, then, of performance? As our debates demonstrate, the apparent effects of the action appear to be as varied as those who comment on them. To describe the ritual as "efficacious" begs the question of intended effect. To suggest that "performativity" explains why you call the ritual efficacious when none of the conditions for a true performative are met and no convincing analysis of poetic and dramatic detail has been offered is pretentious nonsense.

I could be wrong. You could, of course, have some technical definition in mind of which I am unaware. If so, please enlighten us.

For more detail on my take on these issues, see McCreery, "Negotiating with Demons" american ethnologist, 1995, No. 1.

Permalink Reply by M Izabel on October 22, 2010 at 8:43am

Read Performativity by Loxley. This link, http://www.cla.purdue.edu/academic/engl/theory/genderandsex/modules... , can help but, I'm afraid, a little. If I were you I wouldn't waste my time on Google's brief definitions compiled as if for the idiots. Performativity is wide in scope. It includes identity, memory, discourse, experience, imitation, etc. A ritual can be best understood, in my view, if it is treated as a sociocultural performance.

Permalink Reply by Keith Hart on October 22, 2010 at 9:00am

John McCreery said:

But "performativity"? It is hard to imagine a term better described as mealy-mouthed, vacuous, utterly pointless, absolute crap.

Our first rule is:

"No flaming, mobbing or insults
Discussion of fundamental issues is likely to get heated at times. But personal attacks, insults, malicious behavior, bullying or taunting are incompatible with our shared life as a community."

It is hard to imagine a more egregious violation of that rule than the above post. It was wholly disproportionate to what preceded it and did not even have the honesty to be directed to the actual source, a member who intruded into our apparently closed circle for the first time to make the following modest intervention:

M Izabel said:

I think the works of Judith Butler on performativity and enacted discourses and Diana Taylor on the archive and the repertoire as cultural memories will work well in your paper.

To which Philip replied with a brief acknowledgment that may or may not be his last word on the subject.

I have already alluded to our difficulty in attracting wider participation. Here is an example from private correspondence:

"A PhD student I know said that she was following the online seminar and wanted to get involved, but hadn't done so up to now because she thought that there must be some sort of invisible protocol that we were all adhering to."

If we want the seminar to work in something like the way Rachel envisaged in her clip, we have to do our best to dismantle these invisible barriers to participation. Flaming is the last thing we need.

Permalink Reply by John McCreery on October 22, 2010 at 9:11am

Keith, this is not a personal attack. It is a pointed critique of a current usage that is truly abominable and misleading. Neither science nor sound scholarship will survive a retreat to the position that saying anything that someone may find offensive is forbidden.

Also, it is not directed at the individual who cited Judith Butler. It is plainly directed at Phillip, for uncritically accepting the suggestion. And if either comes back with an explication of "performativity" that adds value to ritual analysis, I will be happy to see it.

I am quite sincere. If someone knows of a technical redefinition of "performativity" that has something useful to say, I will be the first to applaud.







Keith Hart said:

John McCreery said:

But "performativity"? It is hard to imagine a term better described as mealy-mouthed, vacuous, utterly pointless, absolute crap.

Our first rule is:

No flaming, mobbing or insults

Discussion of fundamental issues is likely to get heated at times. But personal attacks, insults, malicious behavior, bullying or taunting are incompatible with our shared life as a community.

It is hard to imagine a more egregious violation of that rule than the above post. It was wholly disproportionate to what preceded it and did not even have the honesty to be directed to the actual source, a member who intruded into our apparently closed circle for the first time to make the following modest intervention:

M Izabel said:

I think the works of Judith Butler on performativity and enacted discourses and Diana Taylor on the archive and the repertoire as cultural memories will work well in your paper.

To which Philip replied with a brief acknowledgment that may or may not be his last word on the subject.

I have already alluded to our difficulty in attracting wider participation. here is an example from private correspondence:

"A PhD student I know said that she was following the online seminar and wanted to get involved, but hadn't done so up to now because she thought that there must be some sort of invisible protocol that we were all adhering to."

If we want the seminar to work in something like the way Rachel envisaged in her clip, we have to do our best to dismantle these invisible barriers to participation. Flaming is the last thing we need.

Permalink Reply by M Izabel on October 22, 2010 at 9:12am

Keith, I didn't feel slighted at all. My almost a month in Dharamsala observing Tibetan monks debate and mock each other helped me understand physiological patience and knowledge monopoloy. John was just having fun.

John, read a book written by a scholar. What you read on Google are compiled by high school graduates in India or maybe Philippines..

Permalink Reply by Keith Hart on October 22, 2010 at 9:27am

My point is that the language was unnecessarily abusive and not everyone who might be tempted to join us operates with a Chinese wall between personal and impersonal considerations. You can say that the only insult was directed at a word, but that word's provenance in our conversation had a personal origin and, whatever anyone says, I rule as chair that language as violent as that is unacceptable here.

Permalink Reply by M Izabel on October 22, 2010 at 9:31am

Here's what I got after "googling' Orientalism:

"Orientalism is primarily a term used for the imitation or depiction of aspects of Eastern cultures in the West by writers, designers and artists."

Had I used that definition of Orientalism, I would have missed Said's lectures on imagined geography, permanent exile, and postcolonial melancholia. As readers, we need to be resourceful too. Spoon-feeding is only for babies.

Permalink Reply by John McCreery on October 22, 2010 at 10:12am

M Izabel, thank you for the link.

It does not, as I see it, answer the criticisms I have leveled at "performativity."

Consider the concluding sentences in the piece to which the link points.

"If the 'reality' of gender is constituted by the performance itself, then there is no recourse to an essential and unrealized 'sex' or 'gender' which gender performances ostensibly express" ("Performative" 278). For this reason, "the transvestite's gender is as fully real as anyone whose performance complies with social expectations" ("Performative" 278).

Substitute "prayer" for "gender" and and "salaryman's prayer" for "transvestite's gender" in these sentences and what you have is simply the claim that if it looks like a prayer it is, regardless of whether a Christian might consider it a travesty of prayer or the Japanese salaryman himself might be puzzled by anyone's getting exercised about folding your hands, bowing to an unknown god, and feeling a bit more calm and composed, having had no particular request in mind. This is at best a pointer to a problem. An explanation? No, it just doesn't fly. "Efficacious"? Only in a sense so extended that it ceases to be meaningful.




M Izabel said:

Read Performativity by Loxley. This link, http://www.cla.purdue.edu/academic/engl/theory/genderandsex/modules... , can help but, I'm afraid, a little. If I were you I wouldn't waste my time on Google's brief definitions compiled as if for the idiots. Performativity is wide in scope. It includes identity, memory, discourse, experience, imitation, etc. A ritual can be best understood, in my view, if it is treated as a sociocultural performance.

• ‹ Previous
• 1
• 2
• 3
• 4
• 5
• 6
• Next ›
• Page